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Adapting Alternate Dispute Resolution for use in Administrative Proceedings
by Victor Lawrence I
Suits at court are like winter nights, long and wearisome.2
Introduction
A growing, but controversial trend in administrative law involves the use of
alternative dispute resolution (ADR) to promote expedient, less costly resolution of agency
cases. 3  The trend has either been embraced or criticized by many administrative law
scholars. 4 Recently, two noted scholars, Arthur E. Bonfield and Michael Asimow were
found to be at fault for their near avoidance of the issue in their otherwise much acclaimed
text. State and Federal Administrative Law.5 Writing in a Book Review for the Cornell Law
Review, Edward Brunet noted that the book "devotes scant attention" 6 to this important topic
I Student. University of Richmond School of Law
2 Thonias Deloney in Jack of Newburg. 1597.
3 See hnplementing the ADR Act: Guidpice for Agency Dispute Resolution Specialists.
ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, February 1992 Rep. 3-4. The Administrative
Conference of the United States (ACUS) has taken a leading role in the last several years by promoting ADR
practice in federal agencies. See S. REP. No. 543, 101st Cong.. 2d Sess. 2-3 (providing background
information on ACUS's role in ADR development). The ACUS report is the latest of many disseninated from
that agency that describe initiatives and goals that may enhance agency resolution of cases. See also
ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE U.S. SOURCEBOOK: FEDERAL AGENCY USE OF ALTERNATE MEANS
OFDISPUTE RESOLUTtON 701-860 (1987) (listing and describing increasing agency use of ADR techniques).
4 Walter (Jellhorn, a professor of law at Columbia University, strongly favors use of ADR
techniques in federal agencies. He notes that the language of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) in §
554 necessitating an agency hearing only, "to the extent that the parties are unable so to determine a
contro-ersy by consent," demonstrates that the drafters of the APA were willing to have agencies forego
formal procedures when informal devices such as ADR could be used. See Walter Gellhorn. Testimony
Before the Senate Judiciary Counittee on the Administrative Dispute Resolution Act of 1988, 43 ARB. J.
at 30. Conversely, other scholars fear that such informal techniques are in derogation of the APA and
contribute to a negative trend which moves agency cases further out of the public arena to be resolved behind
closed doors without the benefit of public participation. See 43 ARB. J. at 38-39.
5 ARTHUR E. BONFIELD & MICHAEL ASIMOw, STATE AND FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (1989)
(This recent casebook has been adopted for use at many law schools. Other widely used textbooks were
written before ADR processes were as commonly used as they are now.).
6 Edward Brunet, Blending State and Federal Administrative Law, 75 Cornell L. Rev. 366 (1990)
(reviewing ARTHUR E. BONFIELD & MICHAEL ASIMOW, STATE AND FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (1989)).
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and criticized the authors for not devoting a distinct section in the text to acknowledge the
strength of this movement.
7
This paper examines the curent trend of using ADR in administrative proceedings
and focuses on the additional cautionary measures that should be implemented in the process
to ensure that the administration of justice prevails over the risk of unfair, arbitrary
decisions. Although the Administrative Dispute Resolution Act8 has provided some guidance
in this area, the Act did not go far enough. Additional safeguards are necessary to satisfy
public concern that compliance with statutory ideals are achieved without sacrifice
throughout the arbitration process.
I. The Benefits of ADR in Administrative Proceedings
Given the success that ADR has had in our court system,9 it is indisputable that
ADR use in administrative proceedings similarly does have many benefits. Federal agencies,
through ADR proceedings, enable parties to "foster creative, acceptable solutions, and to
produce expeditious decisions requiring fewer resources than formal litigation."' 1( Therc are
many methods of ADR: negotiation, facilitation, conciliation, convening, minitrials,
71d.
8 Pub. L. No. 101-552, 104 Stat. 2736 (1990). The purpose of the ADR Act of 1990 was to
"place government-wide emphasis on the use of innovative ADR procedures by agencies and to put in place a
statutory framework to foster the effective and sound use of these flexible alternatives to litigation. The goal.
. is to send a clear message to agencies and private parties that the use of ADR to resolve disputes involving
the federal government is an accepted practice and to provide support for agency efforts to develop and/or
enhance individual ADR programs." S. REP. No. 543, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 1-2.
9 The success of ADR in our court system is well documented. For a good text and overview of
the processes used in ADR see STEPHEN B. GOLDBERG, ERIc D. GREEN & FRANK E.A. SANDER, DISPUTE
RESOLUTION (1990) anad LEO KANoWlTZ, CASES AND MATERIALS ON ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION
(1986).
1 0 SEE IMPLEMENTING THE ADR ACT: GUIDANCE FOR AGENCY DISPUTE RESOLUTION SPECIALISTS,
ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, February 1992 Rep. at 9.
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mediation, fact-finding, use of settlement judges, and binding and nonbinding arbitration.1
I1
Each of these has been used to cut down the rising costs of litigation by providing a less
costly resolution process. 12 The most controversial of the group for use in the administrative
process is binding arbitration.
13
On the federal level, many agencies have had considerable success with ADR in
experimental trials over the last few years. The U. S. Merit Systems Protection Board
(MSPB) was one of the first agencies to institute all arbitration process in their appeals
procedure. 14 MSPB reports show that the instituted procedures have cut the time to obtain a
decision in half compared to their more formal procedures.
15 The arbitration process also
showed a 40% cost savings compared to similar disputes litigated under formal
procedures. 
16
Such savings in time and money have encouraged more federal agencies to follow
the lead of the MSPB, and the lead of President Bush when he signed Executive Order No.
12778,17 encouraging ADR use in the l)epartment of Justice. 18 The movement toward
1 'See itfra Appendix for explanations of these processes.
12 See lmpqlementing the ADR Act: G(itknce for Agency Dispute Resolution Specialists.
ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, February 1992 Rep. at 5-7.
13See infra Part Ill.
14See Expediting Settlement of Employee Grievances in the Federal Sector: An Evaluation of the
MSI"B's Appeals Arbitration Procedure. ADMINISTRATtVE CONFERENCE OF THE tI.S., January 198i5 Rep. I.
151d.
16 1d. at 1-6. Other agencies such as the Environmental Protection Agency. the Army Corps of
Engineers and the Department of Justice have saved time and money from individual programs which utilize
ADR methods. S. REP. No. 543, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 2-3.
17Exec. Order No. 12,778, 56 Fed. Reg. 55,195 (1991). Under the President's Civil Justice
Reform Plan, President Bush suggested inter alia that "litigation counsel should be trained in dispute
resolution techniques and skills that can contribute to the prompt, fair, and efficient resolution of claims." Id.
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ADR in administrative proceedings is not just on the federal level. States that have created
dispute resolution offices to promote public awareness and encourage ADR use in state court
and administrative proceedings have reported similar benefits. 19
II. The Eelect of the AI)R Act
The Administrative Dispute Resolution Act amends the Administrative Procedure
Act to authorize parties involved in disputes arising under federal administrative programs to
agree to use ADR methods. 2 0 At the heart of the Act is the goal that each agency explicitly
develop a policy of implementation to enhance the operation of government. 2 1 The Act
requires agencies to designate a senior official as a dispute resolution specialist who will
systematically review all programs offering ADR potential in consultation with the
Administrative Conference.-- This ADR specialist will provide training for selected
personnel, and review grants and contracts for inclusion of clauses encouraging ADR use.2 3
18This Evecutive Order was the driving force behind the publication discussed infra: Guidance
on the Use of Alternative Dispute Resolution for Litigation in the Federal Courts, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
JUSTICE, CIvii. DiVISION, August 1992 Report.
19 See Lawrence Susskind, NIDR's Stale Office of Mediation E.iperiment, NEGOTIATION
JOURNAL 323 (Oct. 1986) At that time, six states had offices: Florida, Hawaii. Massachusetts, New Jersey,
Ohio, and Oregon.
2 0 Marshall J. Breger, Amendments to Procedure Act Encourage Agencies to Use ADR, NAT L
L.J., Mar. 4, 1991 at 28. See also Implementing the ADR Act: Guidance for Agency Dispute Resolution
Specialists, ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, February 1992 Rep. at (i).
2 'Marshall J. Breger, Amendments to Procedure Act Encourage Agencies to Use ADR, NAT L
L.J., Mar. 4, 1991 at 28.
2 2 1d.
2 3 1d.
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Under the Act, a basic condition for invoking ADR proceedings in a case is that all
parties agree to its use.24 If ADR is used, a neutral decider serves at the will of the
parties.2 5 and he/she can be cither a govcrnment employee or any other individual to which
the parties agree. 2 6  Thc Administrative Conference of the United States establishes
standards for the neutrals. 2 7 and maintains a roster of qualified candidates. 2 8 There are
strict confidentiality guidelines to which neutrals must abide.29
If the partics decide to use arbitration. 3 0 the Act allows the traditional
opportunities to bc heard. ptesenlations of evidence and cross examination of witnesses.
3 1
The traditional pro hibi t ons against cx parle comnmunications are similarly guarded against in
arbitration prtoccedimws. 3 2 The arbitral award, unless otherwise provided by agency rule,
need only include "a brief, infOrmal discussion of the factual and legal basis for the
245 I.S.. § 572(a)(1)92). Note that l'uh. L. No. 102-354, 106 Stat. 946 (1992), The
Administrative Procedure Technical Amendmelnts Act of 1991 recently changed the numhering of the sections
in this area of the codte. 'he section numbers listed reflect the updated redesignations in the code.
251d. at § 573(b).
2 6 1d. at § 573(a).
271d. at § 573(c)(t).
281d. at § 573(c)(2)
2 9 1d. at § 574.
3 0 Under § 575. all parties tiust consent before arbitration is allowed.
35 U.S.C. § 579(c)(1).
3 2 1d. at § 579(d).
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award," 33 but does not need to include formal findings of fact or conclusions of law.34 After
thirty days the award becomes final after it is served on all parties.3 5 However, the agency
head has the power to terminate the arbitration proceeding or vacate any award prior to this
thirty day period. 36
I1. Constitutional/Legal Concerns
A. Judicial Review
One note that is repeated throughout articles discussing ADR proceedings is that
"ADR is not appropriate for all cases involving the government." 3 7 But among the cases
suggested for ADR use, the most controversial are those that choose the resolution process of
arbitration. 3 8 Arbitration cases raise policy, practical and constitutional concerns that are not
present in private sector ADR proceedings. 3 9 Even the Department of Justice, although
3 3 1d. at § 580(a)(1).
3 4 1d.
351d. at § 580(b).
361d. at § 580(c).
3 7 Senator Charles E. Grassley & Charles Pou, Jr.. Congress. The Executive Branch. & lleDispute Resolution Process, CONGRESSIONAL FORUM (1991) at It. See also. lmplementing the APR A(t:Guidance for Agency Dispute Resolution Specialists. ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE 01 "Till: I INI'IE)STATES. February 1992 Rep. at (i), "In many cases ... formal procedure is quite valuable, even necessary: in
many others, it is inefficient and potentially detrimental." Id.
38 For a good article describing arbitration process, See generally, Leo Kanowitz. A Iternativ,
Dispute Resolution and the Public Interest: TheArbitration Eperience. 38 HASTINGS 1.J. 239 (1987).
391d.
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supportive of ADR expansion in the federal government, 4 0had expressed concerns about the
use of binding arbitration by agencies which do not already have specific statutory
authorization to do so. Indeed, the Justice Department argued that it could be
unconstitutional. 4 1 Other scholars have disputed this claim, however, and have upheld the
4 0See Guidance on the Use of A lernative Dispute Resolution for Litigation in the Federal
Courts. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, CIVILDIviSION, August 1992 Rep. at 1. "The Department of Justice
views ADR as another tool in its arsenal for achieving success in litigation." Id.
41The Department of Justice had voiced these constitutional concerns:
(1) that the appointment of individuals to be arbitrators may interfere with the Article
II Appointments Clause, since arbitrators will oftentimes not be federal employees;
(2) that a separations-of-powers question would arise due to the fact that Congress,
through the ADR Act is authorizing private parties to perform agency decision-making powers;
(3) that judicial responsibility and authority would be removed from constitutionally
established Article Ill courts; and
(4) that arbitration may interfere with due process.
The Department also suggests that two statutory barriers may prevent arbitration use
by federal agencies:
(1) 31 U.S.C. § 1346 prohibits the use of federal funds to pay, "the pay or expenses of
a conmmission, council, board, or similar group, or a member of that group, or expenses related to the work or
results of work or action of that group" unless authorized by law.
(2) 31 U.S.C. § 3702 provides that "the Comptroller General shall settle all claims of
or against the United States Government."
See S. REP. No. 543, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 5.
See also Testimony of Asst. Attorney General William P. Barr, Office of Legal Counsel (Jan. 31,
1990), Administrative Dispute Resolution Act: Hearing Before the House Subcommittee on Administrative
Law and Governmental Relations of the Committee on the Judiciary, H. REP. No. 67, 101st Cong., 2d Sess,
43-47.
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constitutionality of binding arbitration use in federal agencies as long as there are adequate
procedural safeguards. 4 2
Harold Bruff and other scholars believe that any possible constitutional infraction
is partially offset by the compromise in the Act which allows the agency head thirty days to
vacate an arbitral award. 4 3 Accepting the premise, for now, that no explicit constitutional or
statutory barriers have been pierced because of the addition of this provision, one must still
wonder whether the very nature of conducting confidential arbitration proceedings infringes
upon the public's right to an established precedent in administrative law.4 4
Although the Act outlines several areas where the agency should not use ADR such
as where "a definitive or authoritative resolution of the matter is required fOr precedential
value, and such a proceeding is not likely to be accepted generally as an authoritative
precedent," 4 5 there are no rigid controls on the agency's dispute resolution specialist to abide
by this rule. The public must trust that this agency official has the foresight to recognize an
area that may have significant precedential value and to act responsibly when the situation
arises. The decision by an agency to use or not to use ADR is committed to the discretion of
42See Harold Bruff, Public Programs, Privaie Deciders: The Constitutionality ofArbitration inFederal Programs, 67 TEX. L. REV. 441 (1989).
435 U.S.C. § 580(B),(C) (1992). THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE STRESSES THAT "ARBITRATIONIS APPROPRIATE ONLY WHERE. BY AGREEMENT OR LOCAL RULE, THE UNITED STATES IS NOT BOUND BY THEARBITRATOR'S DECISION. ARBITRATION MAY AID IN RESOLVING DISPUTES ARISING IN AREAS OF THE LAWTHAT REQUIRE TECHNICAL EXPERTISE AND THAT ARE USUALLY SUBMITTED TO THE COURTS ORADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGES." SEE GUIDANCE ON THE USE OF ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION FORLmGATION IN THE FEDERAL COURTS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, CIVIL DIVISION, August 1992 Rep. at
5
4 4Danger exists if important cases with strong precedential value are routinely handed over toarbitrators for decision. If the practice becomes too widespread, administrative law would becomeincreasingly more uncertain. This is analogous, in a sense, to the ongoing controversy that occurs after formaladjudication in some cases where the decisions are designated not to be published. The same "public right toprecedent" argument occurs in both situations.
455 U.S.C. § 572(b)(1) (1992).
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the agency and is subject to a very limited form of judicial review. 4 6 Judicial review by the
district court is authorized to vacate awards only if the use of arbitration is "clearly
inconsistcnt" with the guidelincs set forth in 5 U.S.C. 572.
4 7
B. Congressional Delegation
The constitutionality of delegating adjudicative power to federal agencies has been
firm precedent since Crowell v. JBenson. 4 8 But. Congress, through the AI)R Act. is taking
this one step further. Congress is delegating the power to decide government issues to
[private citizens. 9 The Supreme Court has. through the years. examined whether Congress
can make such a broad dclegaition of lpwcr. The most famous case (n point was Schechter
Poultry Corp. v. IUnited States.5 ( This case considered whether the National Industrial
Rccovery Act (NIRA). essentially allowing private trade groups to enact their own laws for
fair competition (subject to President's approval), was too broad a delegation of legislative
Powlcr. 5 1 The Court found that the Act was unconstitutional, in part because the Act
allo.wed for non-government workers to do work which should have been reserved for the
eovernment.52
4 6 1d. at § 58l(b)(1).
4 7 See 9 U.S.C. § 10(b). Section 572 of Title 5 outlines the general authority of agencies to use
AI)R proceedings.
48285 U.S. 22 (1932).
495 U.S.C. § 573 allows the parties to an ADR proceeding to use "any ... individual who is
acceptable to the parties," regardless of whether they are a government employee, to decide these cases.
50295 U.S. 495 (1935)
51d.
521d.
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Although the rule from Schechter can be interpreted broadly to outlaw
congressional delegation of power to non-government officials under the ADR Act,
subsequent Supreme Court cases leave this area of the law uncertain. For instance, in
Currin v. Wallace,5 3 the Court upheld the Tobacco Inspection Act in which a two-thirds vote
by tobacco growers could regulate the tobacco market. Similarly, in United States v. Rock
Royal Co-op.. 5 4 the Court upheld a provision of the Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act
which allowed private producers, upon a two-thirds vote, to, in effect, issue various
government orders. Without clear Supreme Court precedent as a mandate, Congress may
have overstepped its delegation authority by allowing non-government, private citizens to
participate in government functions in the administrative process. 5 5 The power placed in
the hands of one arbitrator to decide a government issue under the ADR Act appears more
violative than the group-delegated authority present in Currin and Rock-Royal allowing trade
groups and tobacco growers to decide government issues.
C. Limited Requirements on the Arbitrator
Under section 580(a)(1). unless otherwise provided by agency rule. the arbitrator
need only include "a brief, informal discussion of the factual and legal basis for the award."
but does not need to include formal findings of fact or conclusions of law. 5 6 Although I can
think of no constitutional limitation restricting this provision. I believe that such minimal
requirements on the arbitrator lead to short cuts that may be detrimental in the broader
53306 U.S. 1 (1939).
54307 U.S. 533 (1939).
55This is not to say that Congress needs clear Supreme Court precedent as guidance for every Actit passes; but, in areas of significant importance such as these, perhaps Congress may have moved too hastily
when it could have limited the neutrals to be. at least, government employees.
5 6 See supra notes 32-33 and accompanying text.
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scheme. With such loose guidelines, these decisions might eventually come down to a
simple "Yes" or "No" as the exclusive basis for a reasoned decision.
If an arbitrator were not empowered to hear the case, an administrative law judge
would have the responsibility. Although administrative law judges are rarely held to rigid
analyses of law in their opinions, this may be partially offset by the formality of their
procedures. Perhaps to offset the informality of ADR arbitration decisions, a more rigid
analysis of facts and law should be included and required in decisions by the third party
neutrals.
IV. Suggestions for Change
A good way to combat the problem of allowing agency discretion to designate
which cases are appropriate for ADR purposes is to enact a scheme whereby the parties have
to get judicial approval before ADR processes can begin. At first glance, this may seem like
an unnecessary step which defeats one of the purposes of ADR of saving time and efficiency.
But, the system can be established with minimal obstacles.
Two parties interested in using arbitration as a resolution process could go to an
administrative law judge (AL) and briefly summarize the issue at dispute. The AIJ would
consider whether the issue involves important precedential concerns, technical expertise or
other factors which would mandate a full hearing. The AU, optimally, would have
significantly more experience than the agency dispute resolution specialist in determining
whether a particular case should be tried instead of arbitrated. Under such a system, the total
expenditure of time would be no more than the situation where a police officer convinces a
judge to issue a search warrant in a criminal case. The latter situation protects the
individual's fourth amendment rights; the former situation protects the public's right to a
precedent in administrative issues. Both are minimal procedural requirements.
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In any case, there should be broader opportunity for judicial review (f the agency's
decision to use ADR. Third parties that are damaged by an arbitrator's decision should not
have to rely on the "clearly inconsistent" standard to try and convince the district court to
vacate an arbitral award. Instead, third parties should only need to show a "harnful
effect "5 7 that would not have otherwise occurred had arbitration not been used. If third
parties can establish this "harmful effect." the arbitral award should he vacated.
Any arbitrator used in ADR processes in administrative proceedings should be, at
very least, a government official. Although Schechter and its progeny suggcst that in certain
situations such broad congressional delegation of power to non-government officials may not
be unconslitutional. the delegation of the power to decide g-ovcrnmcnt issues by private
citizens appears to overstep Congress's delegation authority. Such broad delegation appears
especially violative when the power is given to one person rather than the form o delcegation
given to groups found in Cujriin and Rock-Royal. To avoid such a constitutional infraction. it
would not be an unreasonable limitation to limit the pool of neutrals to government officials.
Given the size of our government, adequate resources should be plentiful.
Finally, to ensure adequate procedures, and to partially offset the informality of
ADR, the decisions of the arbitrators should include more than a sketchy factual and legal
basis for the decision. A more detailed decision, including factual and legal discussion
would help compensate for the relative informality of the process. The AUl who approves
the case for arbitration would monitor the substance of the arbitrators' opinions to ensure that
the legal and factual issues were adequately discussed.
5 7 Such a "harmful effect" may occur where a third party, previously unaware of the arbitrationproceeding, could have testified though amici briefs or otherwise to convince a court to rule in a mannerconsistent with their interests. As long as the third party can show that he was prejudiced in any manner thatcould have affected the outcome of the decision, the arbitral award should be vacated.
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V. Conclusion
ADR is a very useful tool in resolving legal disputes. The ADR Act is an
encouraging demonstration by Congress to promote ADR techniques into administrative
proceedings. Although tie Act contains many benefits that will facilitate resolution of agency
disputes, more procedural safeguards should be added to ensure its constitutionality and to
protect other legal concerns. If AU's are given (lhe power to approve arbitration in certain
cases and judicial review is made broader for third party complainants the system will
operate beter. Additionally, if arbitrators are limited to government officials and are
required to provide a detailed basis in law and fact for their decisions, other
constitutional/legal concerns would be alleviated.
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APPENDIX
The Administrative Conference's Recommendation 86-3, 1 C.F.R. § 305.86-3 provides these
definitions for each ADR method:
Arbitration - Arbitration is closely akin to adjudication in that a neutral third party decides
the submitted issue after reviewing evidence and hearing argument from the parties. It may
be binding on the parties, either through agreement or operation of law, or it may be 
non-
binding in that the decision is only advisory. Arbitration may be voluntary , where 
the
parties agree to resolve the issues by means of arbitration, or it may be mandatory, where the
process is the exclusive means provided.
Convening - Convening is a technique that helps identify issues in controversy and affected
interests. The convener is generally called upon to determine whether direct negotiations
anong the parties would be suitable means of resolving the issues, and if so, to bring 
the
parties together for that purpose. Convening has proved valuable in negotiated rule making.
Facilitating - Facilitating helps parties reach a decision or a satisfactory resolution 
of the
matter to be addressed. While often used interchangeably with "mediator," a facilitator
generally conducts meetings and coordinates discussions, but does not become as involved 
in
the substantive issues as does a mediator.
Fact-findino - A "fact-finding" proceeding entails the appointment of a person or group 
with
technical expertise in the subject matter to evaluate the matter presented and file a report
establishing the "facts." The factfinder is not authorized to resolve policy issues. Following
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the findings, the parties may then negotiate a settlement, hold further proceedings, or
conduct more research.
Mediation - Mediation involves a neutral third party to assist the parties in negotiating an
agreement. The mediator has no independent authority and does not render a decision; any
decision must be reached by the parties themselves.
Minitrial - A minitrial is a structured settlement process in which each side presents a highly
abbreviated summary of its case before senior officials of each party authorized to settle the
case. A neutral adviser sometimes presides over the proceeding and will render an advisory
opinion if asked to do so. Following the presentations, the officials seek to negotiate a
settlement.
Negotiation - Negotiation is simply communication among people or parties in an effort to
reach an agreement. It is used so routinely that it is frequently overlooked as a specific
means of resolving disputes. In the administrative context, it means procedures and
processes for settling matters that would otherwise be resolved by more formal means.
Journal of the National
Association of Administrative Law Judges
